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RESPONSE
Diagnosis and Treatment of the
"Superiority Problem"
Jay Tidmarsh*
Christine Bartholomew has provided a brilliant diagnosis of the
"superiority problem" in class-action law,I although I am not convinced
that her plan to treat the disease-to resect the superiority requirement
from Rule 23-will cure the patient. As judges, scholars, and
practitioners in the class-action world know, every class action must
meet certain requirements under Federal Rule 23 and comparable
state-law counterparts. Most of these requirements-such as
"adequacy," 5
"typicality,"4
"commonality," 3
"numerosity," 2
6
7
"predominance," and "superiority" -go by single-word descriptors that
mask the complexity of the case law and scholarship that has accreted
over generations to give these terms their meanings.

Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1.
Christine P. Bartholomew, The Failed Superiority Experiment, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1295
(2016).
2.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring as a condition of class certification that "the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable").
3.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring as a condition of certification that "there are
questions of law or fact common to the class").
4.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring that "the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class").
5.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that "the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class"), -(g)(1)(B) (requiring the court to consider various
matters pertinent to a potential class counsel's "ability to fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class"), -(g)(2) (requiring, when more than one attorney seeks to become class
counsel, that the court "appoint the applicant best able to represent the interests of the class").
6.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring, as one of the two conditions of certifying a (b)(3)
class action, that "the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members").
7.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring, as the second conditions of certifying a (b)(3) class
action, that "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy").
*
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Among these terms, none is slipperier to understand than
"superiority." Professor Bartholomew's exegesis of this second
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions is the most analytically
rigorous analysis of the term to date. Although many of us have taught
our students and written about the amorphousness of and
inconsistencies in the term "superiority," 8 Professor Bartholomew's
article demonstrates the extent of the incoherence in present-day
superiority analysis with greater precision and rigor than any prior
work. After reading her analysis, which points out that the same
policies, doctrinal factors, or facts are sometimes used to support class
certification and sometimes used to deny it, everyone should
understand that the superiority emperor has no clothes. Her article is
invaluable if we are to make headway in building a better class-action
rule.
Without in any way diminishing the importance of this analysis,
I want to focus on why the best solution to the "superiority problem" is
not to excise the requirement-or at least not to excise it in the fashion
that Professor Bartholomew suggests.
The heart of Professor Bartholomew's proposal is her
recommendation to retain the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3) and replace Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement with a
general admonishment that courts use their case-management powers
to adjudicate a certified class action.9 In effect, the "predominance-and8.
For a couple of my poor efforts to catalog a few of the issues, ambiguities, and
inconsistencies in courts' handling of the superiority requirement, see JAY TIDMARSH, CLASS
ACTIONS: FIVE PRINCIPLES TO PROMOTE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY § 2.03, at 55-56 (2013); JAY
TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEx LITIGATION 479-80 (2d ed. 2010).

9.
Bartholomew, supra note 1, at 1332-43. At present, Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action
to be maintained when:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Under Professor Bartholomew's proposal, Rule 23(b)(3) would allow class
certification when:
(3) the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members. Adjudication of those questions
shall be handled through case management tools.
Bartholomew, supra note 1, at 1332.
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superiority" requirements of the present Rule 23(b)(3) convert into a
single predominance element, albeit one informed by the casemanagement concerns that, under present Rule 23(b)(3)(D), form part
of the present superiority requirement.
If superiority is as gnarly a concept as Professor Bartholomew
suggests-and it is-its replacement with a simpler rule should be a
cause for celebration. But let me suggest a few reasons, beginning with
the architecture and theory of Rule 23 and then moving to more
particular issues with the specifics of the proposal, that this move would
not achieve the desired outcome of making Rule 23 work more
effectively.

I
The concept of superiority lies at the very heart of Rule 23. On
the one hand, class actions have the potential to create substantial
benefits: preventing under-deterrence through full cost internalization,
lowering transaction costs per claim when individual cases would
otherwise be filed, equalizing plaintiff and defendant incentives to
invest in litigation so that more accurate outcomes are possible, and
ensuring the equal and fair treatment of similarly situated litigants. 10
On the other hand, class actions raise a host of potential policy problems
that to some extent are the mirror images of these benefits: overdeterrence (leading to "legalized blackmail"" as defendants must settle
meritless cases to avoid the risk of a catastrophic judgment), increasing
transaction costs when individual claims would not be filed, agency
costs, loss of autonomy, and questions of democratic legitimacy.12 Class
actions also raise concerns of constitutional significance, including the
basis on which a court can bind class members to a judgment that the
class representative obtains on their behalf. 13

10. For a fuller discussion of these benefits, see TIDMARSH, supranote 8, § 1.03.
11.
This term for class actions was coined by Professor Handler, see Error! Main Document
Only.Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovation in Antitrust SuitsThe Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971), and later incorporated
by some courts into the Rule 23 analysis, see, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Another problem is that class actions
create the opportunity for a kind of legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might
use the threat of a large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement
far in excess of the individual claims' actual worth.").
12.
For a fuller discussion of these costs, see TIDMARSH, supra note 8, § 1.04.
13.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (holding that a "forum
State [that] wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for money damages or similar
relief at law . . . must provide minimal procedural due process protection," including notice and a
right to opt out, when the forum State does not have jurisdiction over the absent class member);
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The entire architecture of Rule 23 is geared toward ensuring
that the benefits of using a class action outweigh the costs: in other
words, the class action is superior to available alternatives. This work
begins in Rule 23(a), where doctrines of commonality, typicality, and
adequacy are designed to "serve as guideposts for determining whether
under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is
economical and whether the named plaintiffs claim and the class
claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will
be fairly and adequately protected in their absence."14 But Rule 23 does
not proceed on the belief that the fairness and efficiency of a class action
under Rule 23(a) is a sufficient reason to certify a class. Rule 23(b)
requires that a class action meet at least one of the four criteria in Rule
23(b)(1)(A), -(b)(1)(B), -(b)(2), and -(b)(3). Put differently, Rule 23(b)
specifies four situations in which a class action that Rule 23(a) has
determined to be fair and efficient is superiorto non-class alternatives
despite the evident costs of class actions.
The first three of the Rule 23(b) criteria cash out this superiority
requirement in three specific factual contexts: (1) when separate nonclass judgments pose a risk to a defendant who might be whipsawed by
inconsistent non-class judgments; 15 (2) when separate non-class
judgments threaten to substantially upset the interests of class
members who would not have been party to those non-class
judgments; 16 and (3) when the class action seeks injunctive or
declaratory relief applicable to the entire class regarding conduct
affecting the class.17 The third context-the injunctive class action-can
perhaps be teased out of the first two, whose roots lay in traditional

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires that
'members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment [only
when] they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present").
14.
Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
15.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (authorizing a class action when the requirements of Rule
23(a) are met and when separate judgments that might be obtained by class members in individual
litigation create a risk of "inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class").
16.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (authorizing a class action when the requirements of Rule
23(a) are met and when separate judgments that might be obtained by class members in individual
litigation create a risk of "adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests").
17.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (authorizing a class action when the requirements of Rule
23(a) are met and when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that
apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole").
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equity practice; 18 but the drafters of the 1966 amendment that gave us
the present Rule 23(b) thought it important to be clear that the class
device was available-and highly desirable-for use in then-nascent
civil rights litigation.1 9 The common theme among class actions in these
three contexts is that, if individual suits are allowed to proceed, a
serious injustice might occur either to those repeatedly caught up in
individual lawsuits or those left out of the individual lawsuits; and the
best solution to the injustice is to preclude individual prosecution of the
claims once Rule 23(a)'s requirements of economy and adequate
representation are established. Indeed, the superiority of certification
in these three contexts is so high that Rule 23 does not afford the
members of these classes a right to opt out. 20
The fourth context-Rule 23(b)(3)-is different. It is a catch-all
provision, designed (as the first three are not) principally for cases
seeking monetary relief.21 Serial prosecution of individual claims in this
context may be inefficient, but it is hardly unjust. The first stated
requirement-predominance of common issues over individual issuesis an important part of the reason why these class actions deserve to be
certified. But the drafters thought that predominance of common issues
alone did not make a fair and efficient class action worth certifying-in
other words, did not make it superior to non-class alternatives given the
many costs of class actions and the value of individual autonomy. More
was necessary, and rather than trying to specify precisely what that
"more" was, Rule 23(b)(3) reverted to the basic principle underlying all
of Rule 23(b)-superiority-as the second requirement. Recognizing the
amorphous nature of the inquiry, the drafters of Rule 23(b)(3) then tried
to put some meat on the bones with four factorS 22 that were
18.
On the equitable origins of the modern class action, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 832-37 (1999); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An HistoricalAnalysis of the Binding Effect
of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998).
19.
See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: DesegregationLitigation and Its Implications for
the Modern ClassAction, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011).
20. The right to opt out is afforded only to members of a (b)(3) class action. Compare FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (not requiring notice of an opt-out right for (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions) with
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (requiring that class members in a (b)(3) class action be given notice
"that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion"). Some courts have
held that, in exceptional circumstances, a class member can opt out of a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class action.
See Error! Main Document Only.Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Cnty. of
Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
21. The Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action can be used for cases involving monetary recovery, but
the circumstances to which it applies-often referred to as "limited fund" cases-are rare. See
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841 (permitting a limited-fund class action when three conditions are met: a
fund "with a definitely ascertained limit"; the distribution of the entirety of the fund "to satisfy all
those with liquidated claims based on a common theory of liability"; and "an equitable, pro rata
distribution").
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). For the text of these factors, see supra note 9.
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unfortunately open ended enough to cause the interpretive morass that
Professor Bartholomew so ably describes. Even when superiority is
shown, however, Rule 23(b)(3) regards the right to choose whether and
how to pursue a legal claim as so valuable that class members are
afforded the right to opt out. 2 3

This description of the role of Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority
requirement is not in itself a sufficient defense of the requirement. But
this description suggests that simply deleting the requirement from
Rule 23, while leaving behind the very pliable predominance
requirement, 24 is potentially dangerous. Even when common issues
predominate, a class action may not be superior to other methods for
resolving a dispute.
It might be argued that other joinder devices such as Rule 20
contain no superiority element, 25 so there is no reason to require it of
Rule 23. But Rule 23 is different, generally precluding the right of class
members to bring common claims once a judgment or settlement is
reached regardless of the class member's consent to, or even knowledge
of, the class action. Under Rule 20, each joined plaintiff must consent
to joinder, thus preserving litigant autonomy. There is no similar
requirement of consent from class members. Our system's respect for
party autonomy, as well as the class action's potential to create other
costs, establish a grundnorm for any class action: class treatment must
be better than non-class options.
Moreover, the fact that other joinder or preclusion rules do not
include a superiority principle in explicit terms is not a reason to
remove the requirement from Rule 23. Instead, it might be an
indictment of the other rules, or at least a frank acknowledgment that
measuring superiority can be a tricky business. Demanding superiority
across all joinder and preclusion alternatives would also mean that a
court would be able to choose only the best technique to resolve each
dispute, a theoretically attractive proposition that would be very
difficult to implement in practice. 26 Nonetheless, given the strong
constitutional and policy concerns with the broad use of class actions,

23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(C)(2)(B)(v).
24. See infra Part II.
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1) (allowing two or more plaintiffs to join together when "they
assert any right to reliefjointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" and "any question of law or
fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action").
26. Moreover, other joinder devices use other rough-and-ready surrogates for superioritysuch as individual consent of each plaintiff in Rule 20, see id., or convenience and the "interests of
justice" in multidistrict litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)-in much the way that Rules 23(b)(1)
and -(b)(2) use surrogates, see supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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the fact that the superiority concept might not work easily in other
joinder contexts is not a reason to eliminate it from Rule 23.
II
The difficulty, therefore, is not with the idea of superiority as a
theoretical matter but rather with, as Professor Bartholomew has
shown, a superiority rule that is so open textured that it leads to
unpredictable results. Professor Bartholomew correctly points out that
courts have handled several superiority-oriented factors inconsistently:
for instance, whether (b)(3) status should be reserved for small-stakes
class actions (ones which are not worth prosecuting on an individual
basis); 2 7 whether the identities of individual class members must be
ascertainable at the time of class certification; 28 whether a court should
consider non-litigation alternatives for resolving a mass dispute in its
superiority analysis; 29 whether the manageability issues presented by
the choice-of-law difficulties in multistate state-law class actions should
bar class certification; 30 and whether individual litigation by class
members (or the lack thereof) should influence class certification. 3 1 One
of the difficulties of her proposal, however, is that, if superiority were
eliminated, courts could just as easily pour the same doctrinal
inconsistencies into other vessels. For instance, rather than treating
ascertainability as a Rule 23(b)(3) superiority issue, some courts
already consider it as part of Rule 23(a)'s requirement that there be a
"class." 32 Similarly, when choice-of-laws concerns generate a cacophony
of legal and factual issues within a purported class, some courts treat
the presence of multiple laws as a question of superiority; but others
analyze the issue as a question of predominance. 33 Because Professor
Bartholomew's
proposal retains the predominance
element,
27. Bartholomew, supra note 1, at 1303-07. Professor Bartholomew also points out that
different courts draw the line for the individual viability of claims at different points. Id. at 130405.
28. Id. at 1307-08.
29. Id. at 1309.
30. Id. at 1310-12.
31. Id. at 1312-14. This list of inconsistencies in courts' interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3)'s
superiority requirement is not intended to be exhaustive; Professor Bartholomew's analysis, as I
have said, is wonderfully deep and rich. I have picked off a few of the high points.
32. See, e.g., Reyes v. City of Rye, No. 13-CV-051 (NSR), 2016 WL 4064042, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
July 28, 2016) (listing ascertainability as an "[i]mplied [r]equirement" of Rule 23(a)); Herrera v.
LCS Fin. Servs. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 666, 672 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("While Rule 23(a) is silent as to
whether the class must be ascertainable, courts have held that the rule implies this requirement.").
33. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We find it
difficult to fathom how common issues could predominate in this case when variations in state law
are thoroughly considered.").
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certification of multistate class actions involving choice-of-law
considerations would simply shift the debate-with all its
inconsistencies-from one term in Rule 23(b)(3) (superiority) to another
term (predominance) without changing or improving the analysis on the
effect of multiple state laws on class certification.
The concerns that drive other inconsistencies that the article
identifies likewise would not end; like the Whack-a-Mole game, the
same concerns would pop up in one or more of the remaining doctrinal
categories. For instance, I could easily craft an argument that
consideration of two of the other superiority factors that Professor
Bartholomew discusses-non-litigation alternatives and the effect of
other litigation-could be subsumed within Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality
and Rule 23(a)(4)'s adequacy requirements.
The issue of whether large-stakes cases are suitable for class
treatment is less easily shoehorned into one of the other doctrinal
categories in the remainder of Rule 23. Eliminating the superiority
requirement might lead to less debate on this issue, but lawyers-in
their ceaseless creativity-will still exploit the existing terms of Rule
23 to make arguments about doctrinal caveats, exceptions, and
limitations. More importantly, Professor Bartholomew's proposal to
stamp out the small-stakes debate creates its own costs. Disagreement
about the wisdom of using the small stakes in the litigation as a marker
for class certification exposes basic divisions among judges, lawyers,
and scholars about the fundamental purpose(s) of class actions. From
the viewpoint that class actions are at best a necessary evil-an
aberration from the ideals of litigant autonomy and individualized
justice-then class actions should be limited just to those cases that
would never be filed individually because of the economic irrationality
of doing so. In other words, only small-stakes cases deserve class-action
treatment. 34 From the viewpoint that class actions act as a valuable
deterrence mechanism to prevent and punish mass wrongdoing, class
actions in small-stakes cases are necessary, but there is also room for
large-stakes class actions. 35 Other theories about the role of class
actions similarly find either more or less room for the use of class
actions in large-stakes cases. In recent years, the first argument has
tended to win out, making large-stakes class actions difficult to
certify. 36 But this debate over the role of class actions in large-stakes
34.

For an excellent exposition of this view, see MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE:

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009).

35. For
Class Action:
36. See
23(b)(3) does

an excellent exposition of this view,
The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases,
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
not exclude from certification cases

see David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation
115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002).
U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("While the text of Rule
in which individual damages run high, the
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litigation remains open and valuable, because it is a debate about first
principles and the normative commitments of those who establish the
rules for the American civil-justice system.
The debate will not disappear merely because the word
"superiority" is lopped out of Rule 23(b)(3). Nor should it disappear. In
my view, both sides of this issue have merit. Like Professor
Bartholomew, I dislike the way in which some courts have used the fact
that a case is not "small stakes" as a near-automatic disqualifier for
class treatment. 37 On the other hand, the view that litigants with "large
enough" cases should have the freedom to decide whether, when, with
whom, and against whom to bring suit-and not to have their claims
swept up in a lawsuit not of their making run by lawyers not of their
choosing-is valid. Class actions promote certain values (like global
deterrence) while they compromise others (like litigant autonomy). In
attempting to balance these concerns, one of the present fulcrums is the
superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), and one of the present
balancing points is small-stakes versus large-stakes litigation. Some
inconsistency in case outcomes is unsurprising as different judges, often
operating with different views of the strength of the competing values,
try to strike the right balance. To throw out the superiority requirement
entirely, however, is to upset the ongoing effort to achieve a proper
balance among litigant autonomy, efficiency, and deterrence in favor of
much broader class certification for large-stakes cases.
Rather than relying on a single, and still amorphous,
predominance requirement to control class certifications under Rule
23(b)(3), Rule 23(b)(3) would be better served by reducing the
superiority element to a clear and certain rule-as in Rules 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(2)-or at least by reducing the superiority element to strong

advisory committee had dominantly in mind vindication of 'the rights of groups of people who
individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.'
(quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A PrefatoryNote, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969))).
37. From my viewpoint, the division between small-stakes and large-stakes litigation is a
rough marker for the critical question, which is whether there is sufficient cohesion within the
class that class treatment is better than alternatives. In some large-stakes cases seeking monetary
recovery, this cohesion exists, so an automatic rejection of certification due to large stakes misses
the point. It is far more likely, however, that this cohesion exists in small-stakes cases, in which
the individual interest in pursuing theories of recovery unique to that individual are overborne by
the reality that the case makes no economic sense to bring on an individual basis. The Advisory
Committee that drafted Rule 23 held a similar view:
The interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call
for denial of a class action. On the other hand, these interests may be theoretic rather
than practical; the class may have a high degree of cohesion and prosecution of the
action through representatives would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake
for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendment.
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presumptions about when class treatment is appropriate and when it is
not. Abandoning the commitment to superiority in Rule 23(b)(3), while
leaving in place only an equally open-textured predominance
requirement, invites the use of class actions whose costs are likely to
exceed their benefits-thus generating even more controversy about a
controversial device.

III
Professor Bartholomew was kind enough to mention my own
proposal to change the present predominance-plus-superiority elements
of Rule 23(b)(3) into a clearer form, 38 suggesting that its emphasis on
the cohesion of class claims shares a common core with her proposal to
jettison superiority in favor of a simple predominance requirement. 39
Indeed, I favor replacement of Rule 23(b)(3)'s open-textured
predominance and superiority requirements with a rule that has more
clarity and certainty. Taking account of the benefits and costs of class
actions, I have tried to craft a rule that is likely to lead to certification
of classes that are socially beneficial (i.e., the benefits of class treatment
exceed the costs). My proposal might be described as "superiority on
steroids"; it requires a high degree of cohesion among the claims of class
members. Unlike the amorphous concept of "predominance" found in
present Rule 23, however, my proposal is specific in its terms and easy
to apply to most factual circumstances. It is also designed to
accommodate within its terms the standards presently found in Rules

23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).
Most importantly, my proposal does not exist in a vacuum. It is
one of a series of linked proposals-including the creation of (1) a clear
standard for adequacy of representation, (2) a simple measure of
attorneys' fees that gives class counsel an incentive to create class
actions of optimal size and to align the interests of class with counsel,
and (3) methods to check the fairness of settlements and achieve a fair
trial of individual damages claims-that were designed collectively to
minimize the costs of class actions, including agency costs and (by
making the conditions for class certification stringent) the loss of
litigant autonomy. 40
My goal in mentioning my own work is not to persuade anyone
that I was correct but rather to suggest that Rule 23 is a complex
38. I introduced my theory in Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 565
(2013), and further refined it in TIDMARSH, supra note 8, ch. 2.
39. See Bartholomew, supra note 1, at 1337 n.266.
40. For a summation of these proposals, which I further worked out in a series of articles,
see TIDMARSH, supra note 8, ch. 3-5.
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system. Changes in one part of the rule may require compensating
changes elsewhere in order to keep the compromises struck by Rule 23
in balance-in other words, to ensure that a class action is truly
superior to other alternatives. Professor Bartholomew is well aware of
this: her compensating change for the elimination of superiority is to
remind judges of their ability to use their case-management powers to
adjudicate the dispute.4 1 In one sense, this proposal does not seem to
compensate for the loss of superiority: judges already enjoy the ability
to exercise case-management powers in class actions by virtue of Rule
16. But to the extent that judges read this exhortation to use their casemanagement tools as adding something new to Rule 23, the addition is
subject to the same critique of vagueness that Professor Bartholomew
levied against the present superiority requirement. The breadth of
judges' case-management powers and the significant discretion that
these powers give judges to affect the outcomes of disputes are wellknown. 42 If the problem of superiority is the capaciousness of its
doctrine-a capaciousness so great that different judges might choose
to certify or not certify a class action on nearly identical factS 43-then
relying on the capaciousness of case-management principles to correct
the problem seems a cure ill suited to the disease.
If superiority is to be eliminated, predominance must also be
abandoned. Some new formula must replace Rule 23(b)(3) in its
entirety. The impulse behind Rule 23(b)(3) is laudable: to give judges
discretion to create socially desirable class actions that escape easy
reduction to a clear and simple rule of the types found in Rules 23(b)(1)
and -(b)(2). The problem of Rule 23(b)(3) is that the factors (especially
superiority) give too much power to courts to get the results they want.
Unless the ills that Professor Bartholomew documents are to be
repeated in a new form, any replacement for Rule 23(b)(3) must be far
more specific and concrete in its terms than the present Rule. Moreover,
its terms must be crafted with an eye to the rest of Rule 23, in particular
the interlinked fairness and efficiency requirements of Rule 23(a) and

41. For the text of Professor Bartholomew's proposal, see supra note 9.
42. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 417-31 (1982)
(describing the breadth and potential costs of pretrial case management, including the potential
for biased decision-making); David L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice
of Rulemaking 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (1989) (arguing sympathetically for judicial
discretion, but noting that "[d]iscretion can be quite dangerous ... when it is unbounded. Judges
are human and humans tend to abuse power when they have it. . . ."). Cf Elizabeth Warren & Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Searchingfor ReorganizationRealities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1285 (1994)
(noting that, in certain bankruptcy cases, "different forms of judicial case management may
significantly affect outcomes").
43. See Bartholomew, supra note 1, at 1303-14 (describing similar class actions in which
different judges made contrary decisions on the issue of class certification).
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the provisions in Rule 23(b)(1) and -(b)(2). Professor Bartholomew's
proposal may not bring us to the promised land, but her article shows
us why the effort to craft a better Rule 23 is both necessary and
worthwhile.

